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Auditing As A Signal
in Small Business Lending
Bala G. D haran

This paper models the borrowing decision of a small firm seeking a bank
loan when it can optionally hire, at a cost, an independent external
auditor to convey its risk characteristics to lenders. The analysis shows
that a necessary condition for a potential borrower to prefer having an
audit to not having an audit is that the borrower’s debt to equity ratio
must be above a certain minimum cut-off value. For observed audit cost
functions, this cut-off debt-equity ratio is higher for smaller initial size
firms. Such firms will forego an audit even if they are of low risk, and
potentially face loan denial and higher interest rate. Additionally, the cut
off debt-equity ratio is an increasing function of audit cost. Hence smaller
audit costs may allow more high quality small firms to reveal their types
to the banks, thus leading to a more partially separating equilibrium.
The model suggests a number of interesting empirical questions for
further study.

I. INTRODUCTION
Borrowers of capital in financial markets face the problem of credibly
informing potential lenders about their projects’ quality since such
messages are subject to moral hazard. This paper models the borrowing
decision of a small firm seeking a bank loan when it can optionally hire,
at a cost, an independent external auditor to validate its cash flow
projections. In other words the auditor’s opinion is assumed to convey the
risk characteristics of the firm to the lenders w ithout error. Of course, firms
which are publicly traded are required by securities laws to have a periodic
audit of their financial statements. Thus a decision to seek an audit of
financial statements is not a choice variable for these firms and hence
cannot act as a signal of firm quality. However, such a signalling option
exists for small firms which are typically closely held. This paper examines
the nature of this decision.
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Signalling models of financial decisions such as dividend policy, equity
financing and debt financing have been examined in the past by numerous
papers including Leland and Pyle [12], Ross [15], Bhattacharya [4,5], Miller
and Rock [13], Titm an and Truem an [19], and others. Titman and Trueman
specifically examine the audit decision and show that the perceived “quality”
of a firm’s choice of auditor (or investment banker) prior to an initial public
offering would be a signal of the firm’s riskiness. Unlike Titman and
Trueman, this paper examines the more basic question of whether or not
the decision to have an audit prior to seeking a loan (say from a bank) can
serve as a signal of the firm’s riskiness. Note that the cost of the audit is always
paid by the borrowing firm, regardless of whether the firm volunteers to have
an audit before requesting the loan or whether the lender requests the audit.
In addition, since the audit can reveal the borrower’s true risk characteristics
to the lender, an audit may actually reduce a borrower’s chance of getting
a loan. Thus the decision to have an audit is a “costly signal” which can
credibly be used to signal the firm’s risk characteristics.
The analysis here shows that a necessary condition for a potential
borrower to prefer having an audit to not having an audit is that the
borrower’s debt to equity ratio must be above a certain minimum cut-off
value. This minimum debt-equity ratio depends on the borrower’s initial
wealth, the borrower’s risk preferences, the investment return distribution,
and the audit cost. In particular, the analysis shows, that the minimum debtequity ratio is an increasing function of the audit cost and a decreasing
function of the initial wealth. In other words, the cut-off debt-equity ratio
is higher for smaller initial size firms.
In the next section, the institutional characteristics of small business
lending are described. In Section 3, the basic model of the firm, the bank,
the audit and the project is set up. Section 4 analyzes the audit decision.
Section 5 examines the effect of firm size and audit cost on the audit decision.
In the concluding section, empirical implications are discussed and some
propositions for empirical testing are outlined.
2. SMALL FIRMS, BANKS AND AUDITING
The role of auditing in small business lending decisions has received some
attention in recent years from U.S. regulators such as the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In addition, there has been much
interest in recent years in the capital formation problems of small business
firms generally and in the regulatory costs incurred by small businesses in
raising capital. One such cost is the cost of audit. Currentiy all U.S.
businesses, regardless of size, must follow the same generally accepted

Auditing As A Signal in Small Business Lending

3

accounting principles (GAAP) to prepare their audited financial reports, and
their CPAs must follow the same generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS) to audit them. It is known that accounting and auditing costs show
positive economies of scale, with auditing costs in particular increasing with
the square root of sales rather than linearly with sales (Simunic [16]; Dopuch
and Simunic [6]). Hence small businesses are likely to find audit costs more
burdensome than larger firms. This has raised suggestions that less costly
reporting requirements (dubbed “little GAAP” and "little GAAS”) should
be developed for use by small businesses (FASB [8]).
In a research study sponsored by the FASB to address these issues, Abdelkhalik [ 1] surveyed end-users such as bank lending officers and found support
for less complex and less expensive small business reporting requirements.
A survey of practicing CPAs by Knutson and Wichmann [11] also found
strong support for such an approach. Anderson et al. [3] note that small firms
have differing characteristics than large firms, such as weaker internal
controls and dominance of an owner-manager, that create unique audit
problems. Similarly, a special committee report of the American Institute
of CPAs examining the issue of “standards overload” for small businesses
recommended the elim ination of certain burdensome auditing and
accounting standards and adoption of a different set of measurement and
disclosure standards for small businesses (AICPA [2]).
A small number of studies have empirically examined whether the
presence or absence of audit (or types of audit) makes a difference in small
business lending decisions. H oughton [9] reports on an Australian
experiment involving 247 lending officers evaluating a hypothetical loan
application for A$60,000 from a small business company with a net worth
of about A$180,000. A third of the subjects received the firm’s financial
statements together with a “clean” opinion from the firm’s auditors. For
another third, the statements were accompanied by a “qualified” auditor’s
opinion. The remaining officers did not get an auditor’s opinion with the
financial statements. Houghton found that the lending outcome “was not
significantly influenced by either the presence or the content of audit
reports.” He notes that his result may have been driven by the small size of
the loan even though the implied debt-equity ratio was large. Somewhat
conflicting results have been reported by studies examining American
lending officers [10] and British lenders [7, 17].
Despite the above studies, many aspects of small business lending remain
in need of further study. For example, we do not know whether the banks
charge differential interest rates for audited and non-audited firms, or the
sensitivity of the audit decision to the banks’ interest rate policies. It is also
not known what decision variables (e.g., availability of collateral; loan size;
firm’s life) are emphasized by banks in the absence of an audited statement.
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Informal discussions with officers of some small and large U.S. banks
reveal that a large percentage of small business borrowers whose loan requests
were approved by the banks were not asked to submit audited financial
statements. However, many borrowers did volunteer audited statements. This
paper examines whether such an action is consistent with a signalling model
in which low risk borrowers elect to use a costly signal to distinguish
themselves from high risk borrowers. The next section provides the model
of the firm and its cost structure.
3. MODEL OF TH E FIRM
The Firm
The potential borrower firm has an initial “wealth” or investible assets,
W, and an increasing, strictly concave continuous utility function, U, defined
on the firm’s end-of-period asset level. *The firm has the opportunity to invest
in a project requiring an investment. I, which is greater than its investible
assets. While the firm can alternatively invest just W in the project, the
optim um investment level for the project is greater than W, motivating the
firm to seek external financing.
Firms differ from one another according to their “risk type,” 6, with
higher values of 6 corresponding to riskier borrowers. A firm’s true risk type
is not observable, unless the firm voluntarily elects to undergo an audit
conducted by an external auditing firm which will provide perfect
information about the firm’s risk type.^
The Project
The project’s end-of-period cash outflow, X, from an initial investment
of I is given by X = (1 + r)g(I), where g{I) is assumed increasing stricdy
concave in I.^ The project’s rate of return, r, is stochastic, defined over the
range [—1, JR] where R is some large value, with a distribution function given
by F{r). The project is considered successful if its rate of return, r, turns out,
ex post, to be greater than a break-even value r^, at which the project cash
flows would be sufficient to repay the loan and the accrued interest to the
bank. If the loan interest rate is a, then rm is solved from
( l + r „ ) g ( / ) = ( l+ a ) i5 .

(1)

If the actual return is less than Vm, then the firm defaults on the loan.'* Note
that Tm depends on the audit decision since the loan amount, B, would be
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larger if an audit is sought (due to the non-zero cost of the audit). In addition,
Tm depends on the firm size, the audit cost, and the interest rate (discussed
below), all of which are firm-specific. Hence the break-even return is firmspecific.
The Bank
Modeling the decision-making process of the bank can be complex, since
bapks can optimize on any one of a number of loan variables such as interest
rate, loan size and mix, quality and amount of collateral offered, firm’s credit
history, etc. In addition, as noted earlier, at present we have very little
empirical data on many of diese decision variables, such as the relationship
between the interest rate charged and loan size, risk type, audit decision etc.
In this paper, it is assumed that the bank’s policy is to approve all loans
if the bank can observe the firm’s risk type from the firm’s audit report and
if the risk type is below a cut-off level, 6*. The interest rate charged, a, is
an increasing function of the observed risk type.^ However, if the firm’s
observed risk type exceeds the bank’s cut-off value, then the loan is denied.
This form of loan approval policy can be due to either regulatory or economic
factors and is commonly observed in banks. As Stiglitz and Weiss [18] and
others have observed, it is in the interest of a bank to turn down credit requests
from high-risk borrowers rather than make loans at higher and higher
interest rates, since very high interest rates will only increase the borrower’s
default risk. Moreover, bank regulations in most countries (and many states
in the U.S.) apply caps on lending rates to protect customers from “usury”
practices. The bank-specific values of the cut-off risk level, d*, and the interest
rate function (including the cut-off interest rate, a* = ol{6*)) are assumed
known to potential borrowers.
If the borrower does not submit to an audit, then the bank does not
observe the borrower’s risk type and hence cannot use it to make the loan
decision. In such cases, the bank is assumed to make the loan decision based
on the size of the loan.^ If the borrower requests a trivially small loan, the
bank assigns a much smaller default risk than if the borrower requests a “very
large” loan without an audit. Specifically, given an unaudited loan request
of size B, the bank would approve the loan with a probability
where
tt{B) = 1 for B = 0 and dTr{B)/dB < 0. In addition, the interest rate charged
on approved loans is a*, which is the highest rate charged by the bank to
firms which submit audited statements (i.e., ot{6*)). This follows from the
bank’s assumption that if the firm does not submit to an audit it must be
of “high risk type,” though, as will shown below, some firms with risk below
6* may also choose to forego an audit because their requested loan size is
very small. In such cases, the firms would win loan approval with a high

6

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE

2(1) 1992

probability, although at the high interest rate of a*. Thus, the combined
policy of chzirging the highest interest rate and making the loan approval
uncertain provides an incentive to large borrow^ers to seek an audit and
potentially get a lower-interest rate loan, while permitting small borrowers
to trade off the cost of audit for the higher interest cost.
4. TH E AUDIT DECISION
If the borrowing firm decides to present the bank with audited financial
statements, it will have to pay its auditor an up-front fee of C{W), which
is assumed to be increasing concave with respect to the firm’s size. As noted
earlier, this assumption is consistent with the findings in the audit-fee
literature, including Simunic [16] who reports that C(W) is a linear function
of the square root of W For the firm, the fee is small and affordable with
respect to initial investible assets, i.e., C{W) < W.
Affordability does not, of course, mean that the audit would be sought.
In particular, if the firm is riskier than B*, it will clearly not volunteer for
an audit as part of its loan request, since the audit will perfectly reveal the
firm’s type to the bank. But even for a firm whose risk type is less then 0*,
an audit is not always preferred unless the desired loan size is “large” relative
to the firm’s asset size. The logic is essentially based on the information
“economies of scale” argument of Wilson [20], viz, the amount borrowed
must be of a certain minimum size relative to the firm’s initial size in order
to “justify” the audit costs, and is similar to that used by Ohlson [14] to show
that it does not pay for a portfolio manager to acquire information unless
the investment level is substantial.
Consider the case where the firm seeks a loan without an audit. The
firm’s expected utility, if the loan is approved, is given by:
7^(7) = f C7[(l+ r)g(I) - (l+a*)(7 - W)]dF(r)
(2)
rm
where the superscript N stands for the “no-audit case. If the loan is not
approved, the borrower can always invest his initial wealth in the project
(though, as noted, this is not the optimal level), giving the firm an expected
utility of T^(W). Hence the ex-ante expected utility of the no-audit decision
is given by:
EU^(I) = ttT^(I) + (1

-

7t) 7^( W).

where tt = 7r{I — W) is the probability of loan approval.

(3)
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The firm’s ex-ante expected utility given an audit decision can be defined
similarly. This means, of course, that the firm’s 6 < 6*, since the firm’s loan
request would be definitely denied otherwise. Thus we need to consider only
the case of loan being approved. Hence we get
£[/"(/) = 1 U [(1 + r)g(I) - (l+a(0){I ~ W + C{W)}]dF{r).

(4)

m

where the superscript A stands for the “audit” case.’ Note that though the
lower bound, rm, in equations (4) and (2) are both computed using equation
(1), the value of
is different in (4) and (2) since the loan amounts are
different.
From the forms of the two ex-ante utility functions, it is clear that the
optimum level of investment would differ for the two decisions. Let be
the potential borrower’s optimal investment level given his decision to seek
a loan without an audit (the no-audit case), and I"*be the optimal investment
level given his decision to apply for a loan with a perfect information audit.
Then the audit decision can be stated as follows: Select audit if EU'^{I'^) >
EU^{I^), i.e., the expected utility from audit-investment should exceed the
no-audit-investment case.*
5. EFFECT OF AUDIT COST AND FIRM SIZE ON AUDIT DECISION
In the U.S. and most other countries, the auditing profession is prohibited
against contingent audit fees. As a result, the audit cost, C{W), is a function
of the firm’s initial size but not the loan amount sought. Therefore it is clear
that there will be investment levels extremely close to W (i.e., as the loan
amount B approaches zero), where it will not pay to have the audit. Moreover,
if a company would find it preferable to have an audit at the optimal
investment level / = /^ and would not need an audit at 7 =
(i.e., no loan
sought), then there must be a cut-off investment level, f , between the initial
wealth level, W, and the optimal investment level, 1^, where the transition
from no-audit to audit would occur. T hat is, at / = 7^, the two expected utility
curves,
and EU^, will intersect, such that
is greater than f for the
case where an audit is preferred to no-audit.
The nature of the audit cost function, therefore, leads to a “firm size
effect” in the audit decision, viz, the desired investment level with an audit
must be “large” relative to initial wealth. Specifically, firms will seek an audit
only if their targeted debt-equity ratio, I^/W, is greater than a cut-off debtequity ratio, f / W ^
This result, which is derived from a simple cost-benefit analysis, raises
an important question: is the cut-off debt-equity ratio a function of firm size?

8

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE

2(1) 1992

More specifically, is the cut-off debt-equity ratio larger for a small business?
This question has public policy implications since more “burdensome values
of the minimal debt-equity ratio for small business firms may be considered
as undesirable for economic objectives such as job creation and venture
capitalism.
To analyze the effect of the firm size on the cut-off debt-equity ratio,
this section will assume that the project production function, X, is
homogeneous of degree one, so that it can be written in the form of the debtequity ratio as follows:
X = (1 + r)g(I) = (1 -1- r)Wg(I/W).
Consider a firm that prefers an “audit and seek loan” decision to a “no-audit
and no-loan” decision. Under the latter case, the initial asset can still be
invested in the project, and thus we get
(1 + r)Wg{I/W) - (1 + a){I - W + C {W)) > (1 + r) Wg{W/W).

(5)

Inequality (5) can be rewritten by dividing both sides by W as
(1 + r)g(I/W) - (1 + a)(I/W - 1 + C (W yW ) > (1 + r)g(l).

(6)

One way to interpret (6) is that when the stated inequality is satisfied, firms
would seek an audit with their loans. Obviously, when / =
the inequality
is not satisfied and audit will never be preferred, consistent with the costbenefit argument stated earlier.
The term C(W)/W in equation (6) represents the per-unit audit cost.
As noted, it is known from past studies that C(W) is increasing concave and
in particular, C(W) is a square root function of W, e.g., C(W) =
where
k is some normalizing factor. For such known audit cost functions, C(W)/
W decreases as W increases. For smaller firms, the audit cost per dollar of
asset is much larger than the cost per asset dollar for larger firms. Thus, from
(6), as W becomes greater, the left hand side gets larger and thus the inequality
is more likely to be met. In other words, given the known structure of audit
cost functions, larger firms are more likely to seek an audit with loans. The
audit cost is more “burdensome” to smaller firms in the sense of C(W)/W
being larger, which leads smaller firms to forego the audit.**
The above discussion suggests that it is a priori less likely that a small
initial size firm would prefer an audit, given what we know about the shape
of the audit cost function. This raises an interesting signalling aspect of the
audit decision problem. If a small firm signals “loan with no audit,” the
bank can interpret this signal in two different ways: 1) the firm is very risky
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(i.e., has 6 > 6*), or 2) the firm is low-risk (0 < 6*) but perceives the audit
to be too costly. Of course, the bank knows that it is unlikely that a smaller
initial size firm would want an audit, even if the firm is "low risk”. On the
other hand, the bank would be much more skeptical of a larger firm that
claims an audit is too costly. For a given debt/equity ratio, it is much more
likely that the true reason a larger firm does not want an audit is that the
firm is high risk. Hence the bank is much more likely to extend a loan with
no audit to a small firm than to a larger firm, for similarly targeted debtequity ratios.
Another interesting signalling aspect of the audit decision problem
relates to the effect of the cost of the signalling on the existence of a separating
equilibrium where banks can identify high-risk firms from low-risk firms
from their audit signals. If audit costs are prohibitively high, neither good
nor poor quality small firms would choose to signal their quality with an
audit. Thus a bank receiving unaudited financial statements from a small
firm applicant cannot infer that the applicant is necessarily of high risk (poor
quality). This would lead to a pooling equilibrium where all applicants are
treated equally (as risky) by the bank.*^ If the audit costs are less burdensome,
(i.e., with C{W)/W becoming smaller for a given level of W), at least some
of the high-quality small firms would seek a loan with audit, but low-quality
firms would still not attempt to have an audit. Thus lower audit costs can
lead to a partially separating equilibrium where at least some of the highquality small firms are distinguishable from the low quality firms.
6. CONCLUSION
The analysis in the paper shows that small business firms seeking loans face
a size hurdle when deciding whether to voluntarily seek an audit. A sizebased audit cost function, such as the square root function observed in
practice, leads small firms below a cut-off size to forego an audit even if they
are of high quality (low risk) from the point of view of the banks. Such firms
then face a non-zero probability that their loans will be denied even when
they are of high quality. The analysis shows that the minimal or cut-off debtequity ratio is an increasing function of audit cost. Hence smaller audit costs
may allow more high quality small firms to reveal their types to the banks,
thus leading to a more partially separating equilibrium.
The analysis suggests a number of interesting empirical questions for
study. The proposition that the minimal debt-equity ratio of audit-seeking
companies is an increasing function of audit costs could be empirically tested
provided data on audit costs and loan files are made available by banks. Banks
would want to know whether there are risk differences between companies
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which seek loans with and without audit (or services such as review or
compilation). They would also be interested in the relationship between their
interest rate policy (i.e., the shape of the a(6) function) and the nature of
small firm audit decision. Small firms would want to know whether the
probability of loan approval is a function of the audit decision. More data
and research on these and related issues are needed to increase our
understanding of the financial markets for small firms.
Acknowledgment: T his paper has benefitted from comments from the seminar participants
at the 2nd Annual Small Business Finance Symposium, Fresno, CA. Suggestions from two
anonymous referees also greatly improved the paper’s modeling.

NOTES
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

Due to limited liability, the utility is assumed zero for all asset levels less than zero.
Such an assumption is consistent with the observed widespread use of audited financial
statements in lending decisions.
T he concavity of g(I) is assumed so that the optimum investment size and hence the
required size of bank loan are finite. The results in the paper do not, for the most part,
depend on the shape of g(I)—for example, linear functions would also suffice. In section
5, however, it is assumed that g(I) is a homogeneous function of degree one.
Due to limited liability, the firm’s utility is lower-bounded at zero in the case of default
T he loan decision and the interest rate may also depend, in practice, on loan size, since
a bank’s resource constraints would usually lim it its lending potential. Here we assume
that the loan request is within the bank’s lending range.
As noted earlier, the loan size is assumed to be within the bank’s normal lending range.
It can be seen that the two ex-ante utility functions given in (3) and (4) are continuous
in I.
T he basic assumption that the firm’s desired investment level. I, is greater than its initial
wealth, W, implies that either
or EU^{I^) is greater than 7^(W^).
Because of the one-to-one relationship between the investment-equity ratio, I/W, and
the corresponding debt-equity ratio, (/ — W )/W , the two terms are used interchangeably
in this paper.
The assumption that C(W) is increasing concave does not, by itself, always imply that
C{WyW is a decreasing function of W. For example if C{W) = In W, then C(W)/W
increases as W increases for values of W in the open interval (0,e). However, for observed
and known functions of audit cost such as the square root function, C{W)/W is indeed
a decreasing function of W.
An exception to this statement would be if g{I/W ) is sufficiently large so that the
inequality in (5) is still satisfied even though C (W )/W is high. However, the investmentequity ratio I /W and consequently the debt equity ratio (I — W )/W may be so large
in such cases that the bank may not grant the loan despite the firm’s risk being below
the bank’s cut-off risk.
At the other extreme, a truly separating equilibrium w ill exist only if the audit cost is
zero. Then all high-quality firms (regardless of firm size or loan size) will choose to have
an audit and all low-quality firms w ill not seek audit
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